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I. INTRODUCTION
“Any person in Government Service should . . . [p]ut loyalty
to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty
to persons, party, or Government department,” and shall
“[e]xpose corruption wherever discovered.”
– United States House of Representatives2
Corruption is a major problem confronting governments
throughout the world.  It serves as “a barrier” to the world eco-
nomic market.3  This malevolence is especially prevalent in the
Americas, where half of the countries score in the bottom half of
1. J.D., summa cum laude, University of Miami School of Law, 2013.  In law
school, Summer worked with the Immigration Clinic and is currently clerking for the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
2. Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess., 72 § B12. (1958) (adopted).
3. http://www.state.gov/p/in/rls/172267.htm
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the corruption index.4 Further, the U. S. Department of State’s
Human Rights Reports cite corruption as a major problem facing
nearly all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere south of the
United States.5
The United States, along with the nations listed in note 4 as
amongst the more corrupt nations, are signatories to the Conven-
tion Against Corruption.  The signatories to the convention advo-
cate and pledge their support to anticorruption measures
worldwide.6   While this treaty is a laudable cause, the United
States has fallen short in protecting those individuals living under
corrupt governments who voice their opposition to such corruption
through whistleblowing and other anticorruption activities.  The
Managing Director at Transparency International, a non-govern-
mental organization that monitors and publicizes corporate and
political corruption in international development, Cobus de
Swardt, stated:
We also have to make sure that individuals who lead by
example are not left to lead alone. . . . Russian
whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky, paid too high a price for
exposing corruption when he died in prison. The search for
justice in that case goes on, as will our efforts to secure
greater protection for whistleblowers around the world.7
Similarly, the United States and the various nation-signato-
ries to the Refugee Convention offer asylum to those persecuted
on account of their race, religion, national origin, social group, or
political opinion.  The United States, through its immigration
courts, regulations, and statutes, redefine how narrow or broad
each asylum ground will be applied.  By example, for the focus of
this article, opposition to government corruption and whistleblow-
ing had not received nationwide recognition as a ground for politi-
4. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, available at http://
www.transparency.org/publications/annual_report. The report ranks countries from 1
to 178.  The following countries rank in the bottom half:  Guatemala, Mexico,
Dominican Republic, Argentina, Bolivia, Guyana, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras,
Haiti, Paraguay, and Venezuela.
5. Links to the STATE DEPARTMENT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE FOR 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/
index.htm.  Various forms of corruption in the opening paragraphs for the nations of:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, Suriname, and Venezuela.
6. See generally The Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 9, 2003, available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026
_E.pdf.
7. ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 4.
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cal asylum in the United States until June 9, 2011.   On that date,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held, in a precedential
opinion in the Matter of N-M-, that opposition to government cor-
ruption and whistleblowing can be the basis for a political asylum
claim.8
The Matter of N-M- is a great advancement for asylum seek-
ers; however, this article will analyze the limited effect this deci-
sion may ultimately have on them.  Section I will survey asylum
law in the United States and the precedential effects of decisions
from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and Circuit Courts
of Appeals.  Section II will explore the developing recognition of
these claims in prior decisions by the BIA and United States Cir-
cuit Courts.  Section III discusses the BIA’s decision and reason-
ing in Matter of N-M-.  In Section IV, this article will analyze the
shortcomings of the decision by evaluating its reasoning and the
two cases decided after it.  Finally, in Section V, this note will dis-
cuss the implications that such shortcomings may have on the
Americas, particularly on Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Hondu-
ras, and Mexico.
II. PRIOR LAW AND PERSPECTIVE
A. Asylum in the United States
Asylum in the United States is based primarily on the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees. The Refugee Convention
defines a refugee as a person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.9
The United States adopted language very close with limits on the
number of beneficiaries. In 1996, the United States added political
opinion as a ground for asylum with unlimited beneficiaries. The
U.S. statute reads:
8. Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526 (BIA 2011).
9. U.N. Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at Art. 1A(2).
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any person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality,
is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.10
To qualify for asylum, the applicant must show that he or she
fears persecution and that the persecution is due to one of the five
protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.11  This is known as the
nexus requirement, which changed in 2005 with the passage of
the REAL ID Act.12  When read with the United States Supreme
Court’s decision I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias,13 the REAL ID Act
requires that the asylum officer or immigration judge determine
that the protected ground was “one central reason” for persecu-
tion, but does not require the protected ground to be the only
reason.14
When the protected ground is political opinion, the statute
technically only requires that the person has the political opinion
or that the persecutors will impute that opinion to the person.
People “are protected from persecution for simply having a politi-
cal opinion.  Expression of the opinion or taking action based upon
it is not required.”15  Nevertheless, courts look to the immigrants’
expressions to determine if he or she truly held a political opinion
and that the alleged persecutor knew of the opinion in order to
persecute the applicant on account of that opinion.16  Thus, the
expressions of the alleged political opinion become the main focus
of these cases.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2013); See also Asylum Officer Basic Training
Course, History of the Affirmative Asylum Program 8 (Jan. 9, 2006).
11. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2013).
12. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
13. See generally I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
14. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 165 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (“[U]nder this
amendment, asylum may be granted where there is more than one motive for
mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the mistreatment is on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. . . .”).
15. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, § 5:17 (2012).
16. See, e.g., Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 463, 466 (4th Cir.  2005).
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B. Jurisdiction in the Immigration Context
Asylum in the United States is a discretionary measure.17
There are two paths to asylum: affirmative asylum and defensive
asylum.18  Affirmative asylum applicants are those present in the
United States and that have not been placed in removal proceed-
ings.19  There is a one-year bar to those applying for affirmative
asylum.20  After the applicant submits his or her application, he or
she will have an interview with an asylum officer who will make a
decision whether to grant the application or refer the application
to an Immigration Judge.21  If the asylum officer grants the peti-
tion, then the person has received asylum and is granted legal sta-
tus in the United States.22
Immigrants who have been placed in removal proceedings
may apply defensively to prevent their removal, which is decided
by an Immigration Judge, a member of the Executive Office of
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), in an adversarial setting.23  Addi-
tionally, those applications not approved in the affirmative
processing will also be sent before an Immigration Judge.24 After a
decision is made, an applicant or the government may choose to
appeal the decision to the BIA.25
The BIA is required to be consistent with statutes and regula-
tions.26  The BIA decisions are binding on all Immigration
17. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(1) (2009).
18. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION





20. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2009).
21. The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION




23. Obtaining Asylum, supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. 8 C.F.R. §1240.15 (2001).
26. See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 30 (BIA 1989).
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Judges,27 unless one of the federal Courts of Appeals overrules it;28
if this happens, then the BIA’s decision is binding on all Immigra-
tion Judges sitting in circuits that have not overruled the BIA
decision.  The BIA decision is appealable to the Circuit Court for
issues of law and fact.29
C. Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions
In 2000, the BIA held that whistleblowing did not constitute a
political expression and was not a political belief for reasons of
asylum law.30
D. Circuit Court Decisions
Several circuit courts have found whistleblowing and anticor-
ruption constitute a political expression for purposes of a political
opinion. A year after the asylum statute was amended to include
unlimited beneficiaries for political opinion asylum, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Marquez v. I.N.S., discussed the implications of asylum
based on corruption.31  The former Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Services (“INS”) argued “generalized conditions of corruption
in a country are very much like civil strife, which cannot justify
asylum for all its victims.”32  The Court agreed with this argument
but also stated that “[w]idespread corruption may not be a ground
for asylum, but political agitation against state corruption might
well be.”33
That dicta became the basis on which the Ninth Circuit over-
27. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(2009) (“Decisions as precedents. Except as Board
decisions may be modified or overruled by the Board or the Attorney General,
decisions of the Board, and decisions of the Attorney General, shall be binding on all
officers and employees of the Department of Homeland Security or immigration
judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the United States. By
majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of the Board
rendered by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to
serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. Selected
decisions designated by the Board, decisions of the Attorney General, and decisions of
the Secretary of Homeland Security to the extent authorized in paragraph (i) of this
section, shall serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or
issues.”).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2005). (IIRIA moved review of all immigration claims to
the federal circuit courts of appeals.); See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (2006), repealed by
IIRIA. (Prior, to IIRIA, federal district courts heard appeals from the BIA.).
29. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.(1) (2009). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2005).
30. Grava v. I.N.S., 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2000).
31. Marquez v. I.N.S., 105 F.3d 374, 381 (7th Cir. 1997)
32. Id. (noting that every victim of corruption can qualify for political asylum, then
“several billion human beings” might be eligible for asylum).
33. Id.
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ruled the BIA in 2000 in Grava v. I.N.S.34  On appeal, the BIA held
“whistleblowing does not constitute an expression of political opin-
ion.”35  The Ninth Circuit, disagreeing, stated broadly that “[w]hen
the alleged corruption is inextricably intertwined with govern-
mental operation, the exposure and prosecution of such an abuse
of public trust is necessarily political.”36 The Court noted that
retaliation alone does not qualify an individual for asylum, but
that retaliation does not “render the opposition any less political
or any less deserving of asylum.”37 Grava established a test for
the Ninth Circuit’s holding that whistleblowing was protected as a
political opinion when “the actions were directed toward a gov-
erning institution,” as opposed to “only against individuals whose
corruption was aberrational.”38
The Sixth Circuit, in its 2004 decision Marku v. Ashcroft,39 is
cited for noting that opposition to government corruption can con-
stitute a political opinion under particular circumstances.40  The
court in Marku stated other circuits’ holdings that opposition to
government corruption is a political opinion, but the court did not
say if it found those authorities persuasive.41  The Sixth Circuit
did not elaborate on those circumstances that could qualify opposi-
tion to government corruption as a political opinion, because it
found that Marku did not present evidence she was persecuted on
account of her political opinion.42 She did not prove that she stood
up against corruption or did anything to express her political
views.  She may have held anticorruption beliefs, but her persecu-
tor did not perceive her actions to be politically or ideologically
motivated.
The next circuit court to hold that opposition to government
corruption could be a political opinion for asylum purposes was
the Second Circuit’s 2005 opinion in Zhang v. Gonzales.43  Justice
Sotomayor wrote, “[O]pposition to endemic corruption or extor-
tion, no less than opposition to other government practices or poli-
cies, may have a political dimension when it transcends mere self-
protection and represents a challenge to the legitimacy or author-
34. Grava, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1181, n. 3.
38. Id. at 1181.
39. See Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982 (6th Cir. 2004).
40. See, e.g., Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d. 540, 548 (2d Cir. 2005).
41. Marku, 380 F.3d at 988.
42. Id. at 989.
43. Zhang, 426 F.3d at 547.
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ity of the ruling regime.”44  For this premise, she cited decisions
from the Ninth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts.45  Sotomayor
clarified what circumstances should be considered in finding that
an applicant for asylum was persecuted or will be persecuted.  She
stated that “the persecutor’s motive need not be solely to overcome
the applicant’s political opinion.”46  In evaluating political asylum
claims based on opposition to governmental corruption it is more
important to look at whom the applicant directed his or her
actions.47  A stronger claim is made when the applicant directed
her opposition to governmental corruption towards a governing
institution rather than a rogue individual.48
The Seventh Circuit later clarified the factors and limitations
to granting asylum based upon opposition to government corrup-
tion in Haxhiu v. Mukasey49 and Dawich v. Holder.50 The Seventh
Circuit held that “to qualify for relief, a whistleblower must seek a
political result by publicly exposing corruption.”51  Thus, the sub-
jective motive of the applicant must be twofold: the immigrant
must seek a “political result” and must be against governmental
corruption.  In addition, the applicant must publicly expose the
corruption.  The Darwich court elaborated that “simply alerting
police of suspected crime is a far cry from forming an anti-corrup-
tion party or speaking out as a public gadfly against political cor-
ruption.”52  The Seventh Circuit previously held that if the
applicant’s job was to fight against government corruption, the
applicant will not be barred from obtaining asylum based on the
persecution from this campaign.53
In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit delivered an opinion that Dor-
isme was not persecuted because of his political opinion.54  Dor-
isme was a Haitian police officer who reported corruption to his
supervisor and arrested corrupt officers.55  Upon doing this, he
44. Id. at 547-548.
45. Id. at 548 (citing Marku, 380 F.3d at 986; Hasan v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 1114,
1120 (9th Cir. 2004); Marquez, 105 F.3d at 381; Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727
(9th Cir. 1988)).
46. Id. at 548.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Haxhiu v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
50. See Darwich v. Holder, 300 F. App’x 596 (7th Cir. 2009).
51. Darwich, 330 F. App’x, at 601.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Dorisme v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 203 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2006).
55. Id. at 945.
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was reprimanded by the police chief “for making arrests outside of
his jurisdiction.”56  When leaving the police station, Dorisme saw
one of the men he arrested outside.57 Three or four men attacked
Dorisme, who sustained injuries requiring hospitalization.58  He
then began receiving threats from anonymous callers telling him
that he would not have a second chance.59  The Immigration Judge
found that Dorisme, by refusing to join in with police corruption,
had not voiced a political opinion.  Dorisme simply did his job
“without regard to political considerations . . . . the threats and
intimidations Dorisme suffered were the result of his harassers’
political opinions, not his own.”60  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the BIA in stating that Dorisme was “targeted because of his
moral stance, not his political one.”61  Additionally, the Eleventh
Circuit did not adopt decisions, like Zhang, which held that oppo-
sition to government corruption was a political opinion.62
The court concludes that Dorisme failed to consider the specif-
ics of his acts against other police officers.  The Eleventh Circuit
stated that he merely refused to cooperate by arresting corrupt
police officers as a fellow officer.63  The Immigration Judge stated
that “the Haitian government and the National Police were
extremely corrupt, without regard to political opinion.”64  This
statement is problematic for three reasons:  First, it is the victim’s
political opinion that is relevant to the inquiry, not the persecu-
tors’.  Second, the corruption was therefore not of some “aberra-
tional” individuals and would thus satisfy the test in Grava.
Third, the Court does not consider the possibility of whistleblow-
ing as an expression of a political opinion, but rather brushes
these actions aside as a moral action.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in
Castro v. Holder and found that whistleblowing concerning gov-
ernmental corruption in a nation plagued by corruption did consti-
tute a political opinion:
The government argue[d] that simply having an affinity for
the rule of law and being against corruption is not a politi-




60. Dorisme v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 203 F. App’x 945, 947 (11th Cir. 2006).
61. Id. at 948.
62. Id. at 948-949.
63. Id. at 949.
64. Id. at 946.
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cal opinion. While that may be true in a stable country gov-
erned by the rule of law, in certain contexts, opposition to
endemic corruption is precisely a political opinion, and
retaliation for expressing such an opinion may constitute
political persecution.65
The Court also dismissed the finding that the nexus requirement
was not met because the corrupt officers were retaliating and not
persecuting based on the applicant’s political stance against cor-
ruption.66  The Court affirmed that asylum may be granted when
the alleged persecutor had mixed motives.67
When the Matter of N-M- was decided, the majority of Cir-
cuits had found that opposition to corruption could constitute a
political opinion.  Whistleblowing as a form of expression for the
opposition to government corruption had not been recognized as
frequently.  The BIA changed this in the Matter of N-M-.
III. THE MATTER OF N-M-
N-M- fled from Colombia in 2004, at a time when the country
suffered from endemic corruption and graft in both the public and
private sectors.68 N-M- worked for thirteen years in administrative
positions with a state-run agency in Colombia.69  In the last six
years of her employment (1998-2004), she faced pressure to cir-
cumvent the required hiring process and to falsify statistical infor-
mation.70  N-M- refused.71 Thereafter, she was overworked and
forced to transfer to another division.72  In the new division, she
continued to voice her concerns to the internal audit department
of the agency regarding this behavior.73  She further refused to
certify payment for uncompleted work.74
From December 2003 to May 2004, N-M- received threatening
phone calls from anonymous callers threatening to kill her and
her son if she did not leave.75  The callers warned her not to call
the police.76  In June 2004, she and her son left for the United
65. Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
66. Id. at 96.
67. Id. at 104.
68. Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526 (BIA 2011).




73. Id. at 527.
74. Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526 ,527 (BIA 2011).
75. Id. at 527-528.
76. Id. at 528.
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States.77  Her son returned to Colombia and his life was again
threatened, as well as his mother’s if she returned to Colombia.78
On July 7, 2009, an Immigration Judge granted N-M-’s appli-
cation for asylum and withholding.79 Matter of N-M- is the BIA’s
decision from a Department of Homeland Security appeal.80  The
Immigration Judge concluded that her actions while working in
the agency constituted a political opinion.81  The BIA assumed the
accuracy of this conclusion, but found that the “one central rea-
son” nexus was not met because the judge did not determine the
motive of these phone calls.82  Thus, the BIA remanded the case
for further fact-finding.83
The BIA’s decision, however, is of great importance to politi-
cal asylum claims because of the analysis and directions given
within the BIA’s reasoning.  The decision has two holdings.  The
first reversed prior BIA case law and now makes the decisions of
many circuit courts binding throughout the United States.  The
Court initially held that “in some circumstances, opposition to
state corruption may provide evidence of an alien’s political opin-
ion or give a persecutor reason to impute such beliefs to an
alien.”84  Second, the BIA held that under the REAL ID Act of
2005, an applicant must do more than show retaliation for oppos-
ing government corruption.  The applicant must also show that
his actual or imputed political belief was one central reason for
the harm.85
The BIA clarified both holdings through examples and direc-
tions to Immigration Judges.  Elaborating on the first holding, the
BIA stated that campaigning through traditional political activi-
ties is one way to show the expression of a political opinion
whether actual or imputed.86  Examples of such activities are:
“founding or being active in a political party that opposes state
corruption, attending or speaking in political rallies on the issue of
eradicating state corruption, or writing or distributing political
materials criticizing state corruption.”87  The BIA also noted that
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 526.
80. Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 525 (BIA 2011).
81. Id. at 526.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 534.
84. Id. at 529.
85. Id. at 529.
86. Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526, 529 (BIA 2011).
87. Id.
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“exposing or threatening to expose government corruption to
higher government authorities, the media, or nongovernmental
watchdog organizations could constitute the expression of a politi-
cal opinion.”88 The BIA noted that the applicant may take anticor-
ruption actions that are motivated by nonpolitical reasons, such
as fear of punishment or financial gain.89 Additionally,
whistleblowing may be motivated by personal revenge or animus
toward a supervisor.90
Even if the applicant has a political opinion, the REAL ID Act
of 2005 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Elias-Zacarias
require that the applicant show that this political opinion is “one
central reason” for the alleged persecution.91  The applicant must
demonstrate that the persecutor’s motive arises from the political
belief.92  An inquiry into the individual persecutor’s motive is nec-
essary through either direct or circumstantial evidence.93  The BIA
rejected the idea that “a demonstration of retaliation for acting
against governmental corruption is sufficient to establish that the
harm occurred on account of the alien’s political opinion,”94
because it fails to consider those who are not acting because of
anticorruption beliefs but out of personal revenge or to avoid expo-
sure of the overall corrupt scheme.
To determine the motive of the alleged persecutor, the BIA
noted three factors for immigration judges to consider:  (1)
“whether and to what extend the alien engaged” in expressions of
anticorruption beliefs; (2) “direct or circumstantial evidence that
the alleged persecutor was motivated by;” and (3) “the pervasive-
ness of government corruption, as well as whether there are direct
ties between the corrupt elements and higher level officials.”95
The first factor requires the immigration judge to look for expres-
sions of the political opinion that the persecutor would be aware
of.  The second factor, arguably the most difficult to prove, cites
case examples where the government or official openly accused
the alien of taking actions against it.   In looking at the third fac-
tor, the immigration judge should consider whether the governing
regime as opposed to the corrupt individual is retaliating.   Stand-
88. Id. at 528.
89. See id. at n. 1.
90. Id.
91. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 531.
95. Id.
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ing up against a rogue official may not be seen as opposition to the
governing regime.
In returning to the case before it, the BIA concluded that the
Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the phone calls were made on
account of her actions against corruption was not clearly errone-
ous although it acknowledged DHS’s concern that the identity of
the callers remains unknown.96  The Immigration Judge failed to
determine the motive for these calls even though they were trig-
gered by N-M-‘s actions.  Following these findings, the BIA sus-
tained the appeal and remanded for further fact-finding.97
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Short-Comings in the Matter of N-M-
The BIA’s decision limits what actions count as anticorrup-
tion or whistleblowing against corrupt officials.  The limitation
begins with the BIA’s definition of political.  The BIA relies on
Zhang and the definition of political in Black’s Law Dictionary
defining “political” as “pertaining to politics; of or relating to the
conduct of government.”98  This definition appears to reflect the
colloquial usage of “political” as exhibited by the Merriam-Web-
ster dictionary.  Its first definition of “political” states “of or relat-
ing to government, a government, or the conduct of government.”99
However, one may find it surprising that reporting corrupt gov-
ernment officials or refusing to participate in a corrupt adminis-
trative process does not qualify as a political activity.  These
individuals are reporting on or refusing to do something that
“relates to the conduct of government.”  The US State Department
categorizes bribes for routine services or in place of fines, and the
overpayment for goods and services in order to give money to
elected officials and political parties, as corruption.100
In Matter of N-M-, the BIA reluctantly acknowledged the sec-
ond half of the definition of “political” in Black’s Law Dictionary
(“of or relating to the conduct of government”).  This is evident in
the examples given by the BIA of when opposition to state corrup-
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 529.
99. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/political (last visited April 7, 2013).
100. 2010 Human Rights Reports: Mexico, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND LABOR, (April 8, 2011), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154512
.htm. [hereinafter Mexico].
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tion may qualify as political.  The BIA lists “classical political
activities” as examples of what “would likely” qualify as the
expression of a political opinion against state corruption.101  This
statement is both self-evident and too limiting.  In many nations,
particularly where corruption is a problem in the governing insti-
tutions, there is little ability to expose corruption to this extent or
to express opposing political beliefs.
The BIA, perhaps in recognizing that the classical activities
are too restrictive, stated that “it is also possible that exposing or
threatening to expose government corruption to higher govern-
ment authorities, the media, or nongovernmental watchdog orga-
nizations could constitute the expression of a political opinion.”102
The BIA noted that this action may be done for nonpolitical rea-
sons or “reasons other than a genuine concern for the practices of
good government.”103 Once again this fails to recognize the second
half of the definition of “political.” What the asylum petitioner is
alleging he or she has complained about is, in itself, a political
statement.  The definition of political does not require a concern
for good government, but simply that the activity or opinion has
something to do with government.
The examples of what actions may constitute the expression
of a political opinion or an imputed political opinion causes further
complications for those standing up against corruption.  The
examples limit future applicants in two ways.  First, it now
appears that the applicant must do or participate in an expression
of the political belief.  The statute, however, does not require an
expression of political opinion to qualify for asylum, but only a
political opinion or imputed opinion.  While expression of a politi-
cal opinion is useful for evidentiary purposes, it is not required by
the statute as the BIA suggests here.
In order to determine if the applicant has met the nexus
requirement for asylum cases involving whistleblowing and/or
opposition to state corruption, the BIA explains that “corrupt offi-
cials who act solely out of personal revenge or a desire to avoid the
exposure of a lucrative scheme of corruption” without regard to
the petitioner’s political beliefs would not meet the nexus require-
ments.104  Once again, the BIA narrows its definition of “political”
when it states this and cites its 2010 decision, Matter of C-T-L,
101. Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 529.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 535, n. 1.
104. Id. at 531.
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where a former employee of a police officer and businessman
reported the officer’s blackmailing scheme and appeared on televi-
sion to expose the wrongdoings.105 The BIA found that the police
officers retaliated against the petitioner because he interfered
with their private money-making scheme and not because he held
a political opinion.106  Under this logic, one could argue that only
political beliefs in regard to a political party or governing system
are the only beliefs that qualify for political asylum.   One could
also find that the petitioner in Matter of C-T-L, met at least two of
the three factors listed in Matter of N-M- to determine if a nexus
existed.107
The BIA gives Immigration Judges three considerations to
follow.  The first of the factors is clearly relevant to the inquiry.
The BIA cited to Marku, which found no nexus because the
anticorruption beliefs were not expressed to the alleged persecu-
tor.108 The considerations for an Immigration Judge in determin-
ing if the activities could be perceived as anticorruption beliefs are
both straightforward and easy to understand.  Nevertheless, the
BIA should have included a reminder in the opinion to the judges
that not all of these activities are possible for individuals living in
nations with the most egregious human rights violations.
The second factor to be considered by an Immigration Judge
also appears to be a straight-forward application to meet the
nexus requirement.  However, the likelihood that a government or
agency of the government would use public means to target those
who bravely stand up against corruption on their own appears
small.  This hinders the ability of those most invested in ferreting
out governmental corruption to file a successful asylum case.  The
allowance of circumstantial evidence is helpful to these lone indi-
viduals. For example, accounts of threats from the persecutors are
105. Matter of C-T-L, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 342 (BIA 2010).
106. Id. at 349.
107. See Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 530-531.  The petitioner could satisfy the
first of the factors listed because he publicly denounced corruption in the police
department by going on television and caused the police officer to be suspended for
two months.  Although it was not a frequent occurrence, it was very likely that the
police officer knew of these activities.  The petitioner also may meet the third factor –
the pervasiveness of government corruption; 2010 Human Rights Report: Brazil,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, (April 8, 2011), http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/160156.pdf at 20. Although Brazil for 2010
does not fall in the lower half of nations on the Corruption Index, the US State
Department reports note that “officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with
impunity. . . [and] corruption continued to be a severe problem.”
108. See Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 530.
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helpful, but as Matter of N-M- exemplifies, the threat must shed
some light on the motivation of the persecutor.109  Thus, a threat to
kill the person after the reporting of a corrupt act, but without an
identification of the caller, may be insufficient to meet this factor.
As applied in N-M-, the BIA found that “simply because the calls
were triggered by the respondent’s actions, which obstructed the
corrupt officials’ operations and threatened to expose them, does
not necessarily mean that the callers were motivated by the
respondent’s political opinion.”110  The Immigration Judge did not
determine if the callers “perceived the respondent to pose a politi-
cal threat or merely a challenge to their personal scheme.”111
The third factor to consider is the pervasiveness of govern-
ment corruption.  According to the BIA, exposing corrupt acts of
rogue officials acting without the support of the governing regime
makes the act less likely to be perceived as politically motivated or
politically threatening.112  The relevancy of this factor to the nexus
requirement is unclear other than to determine the likely motive
of the persecutor.  The factor also looks to identify the persecutor
and whether he or she had the backing of the governing institu-
tion in order to find the motive of the persecutor.  While, these
certainly can shed some light on the motivation, this factor should
not be conclusive on its own.
Thus, the principal decision is not as expansive as some
wished.  The BIA, by altering the definition of political and
expanding upon the Immigration Judge’s inquiries to find a
nexus, has limited the holding of the case to a few applicants.
Those who stand up against corrupt officials and suffer from per-
secution may still not have the protection that they may deserve
from political asylum in the United States.
B. New Decisions
The Sixth Circuit113 and the Ninth Circuit114 are the only cir-
cuits to have decided a case concerning opposition to state corrup-
tion and whistleblowing since the BIA decided Matter of N-M-.  In
the Sixth Circuit’s decision, Khakhnelidze v. Holder, the applicant
foiled a robbery attempt in Parliament and refused to take a
109. Id. at 531.
110. Id. at 534.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 533.
113. See Khakhnelidze v. Holder, 432 F. App’x 564 (6th Cir. 2011).
114. See Lee v. Holder, No. 10 71265, 464 F. App’x 657 (9th Cir. 2011).
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bribe.115  He notified his supervisor that he knew it was an inside
job because there was no other way for the robbers to know how to
escape.116  His supervisor informed him that the case was closed
and then transferred him to the airport.117  Later the applicant
received threatening phone calls; additionally his son was kid-
napped and beaten.118  While unrepresented by counsel, the appli-
cant failed to use the word “corruption” in his asylum
application.119  He never suggested that he acted because he was
opposed to corruption, but rather stated that he “did the only
thing any honest man would do.”120  The Sixth Circuit found this to
be definitive.  The Sixth Circuit cited the list given by the BIA in
Matter of N-M- as an exhaustive list as to what could constitute an
expression of opposition to corruption.121  The court noted “he
never used the word corruption and he described none of the clas-
sic political activities suggestive of a campaign against govern-
ment corruption.”122  This reading of Matter of N-M- is harsher
than prior opinions.  The circuit courts previously did not require
activities “suggestive of a campaign against government corrup-
tion,” but rather that the political expression is aimed at more
than a rogue individual.
The Ninth Circuit upheld a denial of asylum in Lee v. Holder.
The petitioner argued that he was persecuted on account of his
political opinion because he exposed police corruption in a civil
lawsuit in 2002.123  The BIA found that the corrupt policemen
involved constituted a small minority and thus would likely not
“be perceived as opposition toward a governing institution.”124 The
police did not give a reason for the 2003 beating of the petitioner,
although they did offer explanations for the two prior beatings.125
The BIA concluded that because there were non-political reasons
for the first two, the third beating could also be unmotivated by a
political opinion.126  The Court found that the petitioner “failed to






121. Khakhnelidze, 432 F. App’x at 571-576.
122. Id. at 572 (citing Matter of N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526 (BIA 2011)).
123. Lee, 432 F. App’x at 658.
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show an explicit connection between the beatings and his sup-
posed political opinion” and upheld the BIA’s decision.127
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit applied Matter of N-
M- unfavorably to the petitioner.  In a dissenting opinion in Lee,
Judge Paez argued that the BIA only discussed one of the three
factors listed in Matter of N-M-. The BIA, according to Judge Paez,
only examined the extent of the petitioner’s involvement in activi-
ties that constitute an expression of the political belief and failed
to examine the circumstantial evidence of what motivated the per-
secutor or the pervasiveness of the corruption.128 By finding that
the failure to meet only one factor results in non-protected politi-
cal opinion, the Sixth Circuit has also read and applied Matter of
N-M- too narrowly.
C. Corruption in the Americas
This section focuses on the corruption problems facing five
nations in the Americas: Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras,
and Mexico.  Each of these countries ranks in the bottom half of
nations included in the Corruption Index and have problems of
corruption noted as a major human rights abuse by the U.S. State
Department for 2010.129  While detailing the problems of corrup-
tion facing each nation, this section will also examine the asylum
rates associated with each country.130  These rates are derived
from the 2010 Asylum Statistics.  In that year, 19,423 applications
were reviewed, and approximately forty-nine percent were
denied.131  The denial rate for those applicants from the Americas,
as discussed previously, is remarkably higher than other areas of
the world.132  In addition, the top ten countries by denial rates are
all in the Americas, and all the nations in the Americas have a
denial rate from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2010 that surpasses
the 2010 worldwide average denial rate.133
127. Id.
128. Id. at 659-660.
129. See Transparency International, Annual Report 2010, supra note 4.
130. There is no data available giving the ground for asylum claimed in each of the
cases decided.
131. See FY 2010 Asylum Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office of
Immigration Review Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FY10AsyStats.pdf.  These numbers are a combination of
the totals given for granted and denied. Percentages are taken by dividing the
number of applications granted or denied by the total number of applications granted
or denied.
132. Id.
133. See FY 2008 Asylum Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office of
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Haiti is tied with Iran on the Corruption Index with a score of
2.4 and a ranking of 134 out of 178.134 The 2010 Human Rights
report cites “allegations of extrajudicial killings by Haitian
National Police (HNP) officers” and “severe corruption in all
branches of government.”135  The report further notes that the
November 2010 election prevented many from exercising their
right to change their government and was plagued by fraud.136
Haitian law imposes criminal penalties for official corruption;
however, “officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impu-
nity.”137  This endemic corruption plagues all levels and branches
of the Haitian government.138  With a government permeated with
corruption, it is surprising to find that of the 663 asylum appli-
cants from Haiti only 167 of the applicants were granted asy-
lum.139  Approximately 75% of the applicants from Haiti were
denied, while only 36% of applicants from Iran were denied.140
An even greater disparity in acceptance rates can be found for
those applicants from Guatemala.  In 2010, 1,170 applications
were decided, with a denial rate of nearly eighty-six percent141
Unlike Haiti, Guatemala is ranked just barely in the bottom half
of nations in the Corruption Index with a score of 3.2.142  Although
the corruption in Guatemala does not appear to reach the depths
of that in Haiti, the larger disparity in rejection is alarming when
considered alongside the Human Rights Report for 2010, which
lists human rights abuses as including the following: “the govern-
ment’s failure to investigate and punish unlawful killings commit-
Immigration Review Office of Planning, Analysis, and Technology, available http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FY08AsyStats.pdf
134. See Transparency International, Annual Report 2010, supra note 4.
135. 2010 Human Rights Reports: Haiti, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, (April 10, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/
154509.htm.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id.
139. FY 2010 Asylum Statistics, supra note 131.
140. Compare 2010 Human Rights Report: Haiti, supra note 134 with 2010
Human Rights Report: Iran, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, (April
10, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154461.htm
(Although one may argue that Iran suffers from numerous other human rights abuses
in comparison to Haiti, the significant additional abuses are found in the treatment of
Jews, women activists, and the freedom of press. Iran also restricts civil liberties
including the freedom of religion It may also be noted that the language used in
describing Iran, a foe of the United States, is much stronger than that describing
Haiti, a neighbor and friend of the United States.).
141. FY 2010 Asylum Statistics, supra note 131.
142. See Transparency International, Annual Report 2010, supra note 4.
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ted by members of the security forces. . .corruption and
substantial inadequacies in the police and judicial sectors; [and]
police involvement in serious crimes, including unlawful killings,
drug trafficking, and extortion.”143
Police killings become even more troublesome because
“[c]orruption, intimidation, and ineffectiveness within the police
and other institutions prevented adequate investigation of many
[unlawful] killings [by police] as well as the arrest and successful
prosecution of perpetrators.”144   Police officers have been accused
of stopping buses and cars in order to bribe, steal, kidnap, assault,
rape, and threaten to bring false drug charges to extort money or
sexual favors from passengers.145  When allegations were brought
against police officers, the officers were often transferred instead
of investigated.146  The Office of Professional Responsibility for the
police investigated 787 police officers; half of the police officers
investigated were exonerated, none were terminated as a result of
the proceedings, and the remaining 348 cases resulted in few
going to trial.147  Further corruption can be found in the judiciary
preventing fair or timely trials.148
Nicaraguan asylum statistics are also troubling–of 121 appli-
cations decided, 106 were denied.149  Nicaragua, with a score of 2.5
and a ranking of 127th is among the most corrupt nations in the
Americas according to the Corruption Index.150 The State Depart-
ment reports that there are occasionally unlawful killings by
security forces and police, some of which are investigated and
punished.151  Widespread corruption is also found in the Supreme
Judicial Council, the Supreme Electoral Council, and other gov-
ernment organs.152  The report refers to an incident on March 17,
2010 where police assaulted two members of a resistance group
143. 2010 Human Rights Reports: Guatemala, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND LABOR, (April 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2010/wha/154507.htm [hereinafter Guatemala] (indicating that Guatemala is ranked
91st out of 178 nations).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 8.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 9.
148. See id. at 10.
149. FY 2010 Asylum Statistics, supra note 131.
150. See Transparency International, Annual Report 2010, supra note 4.
151. 2010 Human Rights Reports: Nicaragua, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 1, 9 (April 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2010/wha/154513.htm [hereinafter Nicaragua]
152. Id. (“The judiciary remains susceptible to corruption and politicization and did
not function independently.”).
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distributing flyers against government corruption.153  More
detailed examples of corruption in the report include executive
branch officials dispensing funds outside of the normal budgetary
process and the use of a Zero-Hunger program to give more money
to areas containing a higher population of the majority party affil-
iated residents than to the poorest areas.154 The judicial branch’s
independence and susceptibility to corruption worsened when the
governing Sandinista party replaced seven Supreme Court jus-
tices in time to ensure that they would not stop the president from
running for reelection, despite the questionable constitutionality
of his reelection.155
Honduras is more corrupt than Nicaragua, but has a slightly
better asylum approval rate of fifteen percent.156  Human rights
problems in Honduras include “unlawful killings by police and
government agents. . .corruption and impunity within the security
forces. . .politicization, corruption, and institutional weakness of
the judiciary; [and] corruption in the legislative and executive
branches.”157  The State Department notes that corruption and
impunity are serious problems, with ninety-five ongoing investiga-
tions against police officers underway.158  Although the Honduran
government has instituted new disclosure laws and anti-corrup-
tion measures, the widespread public perception is that it is not
working to combat high-level corruption.159   Honduras has been
somewhat successful in fighting corruption, exhibited by the
recent news that 176 Honduran National Police were arrested on
corruption charges.160
Mexico, perhaps surprisingly, ranks 98th on the Corruption
Index with a score of 3.1.161  Eighty-eight percent of Mexican asy-
lum applications were denied.162  The State Department notes
problems such as “[c]orruption, inefficiency, and lack of trans-
153. Id. at 4. Additionally, there were no developments in the case and none were
expected to develop.
154. Id. at 19-20.
155. Id. at 20.
156. FY 2010 Asylum Statistics, supra note 131.
157. 2010 Human Rights Reports: Honduras, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 1,1 (April 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2010/wha/154510.htm.
158. See id. at 14.
159. Id. at 26.
160. Honduras arrests 176 police in corruption purge, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15586060.
161. See Transparency International, Annual Report 2010, supra note 4.
162. FY 2010 Asylum Statistics, supra note 131.
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parency that engendered impunity within the judicial system.”163
In addition, there were several reports of forced disappearances by
the army and police.164 Journalists practice self-censorship when
covering corrupt public officials and crime.165  They acknowledge
that investigative journalism poses a threat to them and their
families.166  Mexican President Felipe Calderón spoke of corrup-
tion being a serious problem in the police forces.167  Police have
been involved in kidnapping, extortion, and in providing protec-
tion for, or acting directly on behalf of, organized crime and drug
traffickers.168  In 2009, 3,600 of the 34,500 Federal Police officers
were dismissed for failing to perform their duties or engaging in
criminal misconduct, and 1,200 more officers were still under
investigation.169  The Mexican police, however, are not the only
corrupt institution as corruption remains a problem at all levels of
government.  Acts of corruption include bribery for routine ser-
vices or in place of fines, and overpaying for goods and services in
order to give money to elected officials and political parties.170
Mayors, congressmen and migration officers are just a few of the
officials charged with corruption in 2010.171
D. Impact on the Eleventh Circuit Decision? Or
Jurisdiction?
The Eleventh Circuit is one of the few circuit courts that has
not yet expressly found whistleblowing and opposition to state cor-
ruption to be a political opinion for asylum purposes.  In addition,
it is home to many of the Immigration Judges with the highest
denial rates for asylum cases.  The Immigration Courts in the
Eleventh Circuit had a higher denial rate from fiscal year 2008 to
fiscal year 2010 than the nationwide average denial rates, which
163. 2010 Human Rights Reports: Mexico, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND LABOR, 1,1 (April 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/
wha/154512.htm.
164. Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 22 (“President Calderón remarked in speeches in March and October [of
2010] that corruption was a serious problem in the police forces and a primary reason
for the use of the military in the domestic counternarcotics fight.”).
168. Id. at 5.
169. 2010 Human Rights Reports: Mexico, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND LABOR, 1,24 (April 8, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/
wha/154512.htm.
170. Id. at 22.
171. Id. at 22-23.
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ranged in the mid-to-lower fifties.172  Atlanta’s judges had an aver-
age denial rate of 79.2 percent; Orlando’s denial rate was slightly
lower with 70.8 percent and Miami’s two Immigration courts had
75.6 percent and 93.8 percent denial rates, respectively.173  More
time, research, and statistical data would need to be compiled to
determine if the denial rates will decrease for the nations of the
Western Hemisphere, with many of those immigrants arriving
and living in the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit.
V. CONCLUSION
“Lack of political will and rampant impunity facilitated
government corruption.”
–U.S. State Department174
Corruption remains a serious problem in nations of the West-
ern Hemisphere. However, for a nation that is dedicated, through
treaties and speeches, to helping these nations combat corruption,
one must wonder how the United States plans to aid the political
morale in its neighboring countries where both the corruption and
U.S. asylum denial rates are very high.
As those seeking asylum in the United States wait to find out
if the Matter of N-M- will give them the protection they need after
standing up against corruption in their home nations, former Sec-
retary of State Hillary Clinton reminded the U.S. of the power
that a few individuals can have.  She stated the following on Inter-
national Anticorruption Day:
Today—and every day—we celebrate the work of activ-
ists, businesses, and government officials who tirelessly
fight to end corruption and promote open and transparent
government. From a fruit vendor in Tunisia who inspired a
popular uprising, to the daily work of activists from Latin
America to Asia, people around the world are showing that
they will not accept the corruption that prevents too many
from living with dignity and having opportunities to realize
their potential. . ..The events of this past year have
reminded us of the difference that ordinary citizens can
make. We must continue to draw from their inspiration and
172. Asylum Denial Rates in Immigration Courts, TRACIMMIGRATION, available at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/include/asyltimedenG.html.  (Including
data for FY 2010 only covered to June 21, 2010).
173. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts Before and After the
Attorney General’s Directive, TRACIMMIGRATION, available at http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/240/include/denialrates.html.
174. Guatemala, supra note 143, at 18.
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stand up for the rights of those who don’t have the opportu-
nity to realize her or his potential. We must strengthen our
own commitment as we fight corruption around the
world.175
Perhaps those courts and judges involved in the asylum pro-
cess were listening.  A few people through small and ordinary acts
can bring change.  The United States has found hope in this pro-
cess in the Middle East.  In time these small acts may affect
change in the nations of the Western Hemisphere.  The people to
whom Secretary of State Clinton was committed may very well
one day need protection when leaving their home nations. They
should be assured that their efforts will not be viewed as
“nonpolitical” and returned to face persecution in their home coun-
tries. They are affecting changes in their governments, one of the
noblest political acts a citizen can take.
175. Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton, International Anticorruption Day
Press Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (December 9, 2011), available at http://www.
state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/178568.htm.
